How to check your project after the GitHub Actions attack

The November 2026 wfx attack stole secrets via GitHub Actions and npm postinstall. How to find traces, what to rotate and how to turn off install scripts.

A grid of grey squares with four of them highlighted in coral

If your code is on GitHub, check your repositories for the branches, pull requests and commits left by the attack of November 10 and 11, 2026, and rotate every secret the compromised account could reach. Then stop npm from running install scripts automatically, because part of the attack went through them. Below is a step-by-step procedure and numbers from our crossword and word search mobile app.

The attack concerns anyone who uses GitHub Actions (automated builds and deployments on GitHub) or installs packages from npm, which includes ordinary React Native projects and web apps.

What happened

According to the analysis by Aikido Security, an attacker with stolen access to 4,837 GitHub accounts first opened test pull requests in 61,764 repositories to find out where they could write. There they added a script that stole secrets: either to an existing GitHub Actions workflow, or as an npm postinstall, a script that runs after npm install. The second route also hit developers' machines, not just build servers.

The script took workflow secrets and variables, GitHub tokens, credential files for AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, npm and SSH, and a copy of the repository. The attacker usually reverted the change within minutes, and the run logs disappeared with it. According to Aikido, the code ran in at least 1,835 repositories. The name wfx comes from the prefix the attacker gave to branches, artifacts and credentials.

Attack diagram: a key, a branch with a pull request, a gear and a package, arrows to the attacker's server
How the attack worked: a stolen token, a test pull request, a script in a workflow or in postinstall, secrets sent to the attacker's server.

Step 1: Look for traces in your repositories

Go through every repository someone on your team can write to and look for:

  • a pull request titled "docs: dependency audit notes" opened on November 10 or 11, 2026. If it exists, its author's account is compromised, even if you find nothing else;
  • branches wfx-docs, chore/ followed by eight random characters, and ci-check- followed by four digits;
  • commits "ci: refresh build cache", "chore: add ci helper", "chore: add dependency audit workflow", "ci: restore" and "ci: cleanup";
  • a .ci- file with a random suffix and a new postinstall in package.json;
  • a missing run number in the GitHub Actions history. The attacker deleted the run along with its logs, so a gap in the numbering is often the only trace.

If you use a cloud provider, check its logs too: in AWS, sessions and roles with names starting with wfx-; in Azure, federated credentials named wfx-ci-. The full list of indicators, including IP addresses, is in the Aikido article.

Step 2: If you find something, rotate everything

If the script ran, treat every secret and every cloud role the workflow could access as stolen, not only the ones the workflow actually used.

  • Revoke the compromised account's tokens, SSH keys, app authorizations and sessions, and turn on two-factor authentication.
  • Rotate repository and organization secrets and variables.
  • Treat any machine where someone ran npm install on a compromised commit as compromised, and rotate the credentials stored on it.
  • Don't assume you are safe because you see no wfx- artifacts. According to Aikido, their absence doesn't mean nothing was taken.

Why postinstall is dangerous even without CI

Up to version 11, npm install automatically runs the preinstall, install and postinstall scripts of every package in the dependency tree. One compromised package or one forged commit in your package.json is enough for someone else's code to run with your permissions on your machine.

Most packages don't need scripts. Our Crosswords and word search app (App Store, Google Play), built with React Native, has 1,044 packages after installation, and four of them have an install script:

A grid of 1,044 squares, four of them highlighted
Each square is one package in the app's project. The four highlighted ones run a script on installation.
Package What the script does Needed?
sharp (image processing) checks whether it needs to compile from source; binaries come as regular dependencies not in the usual case
@sentry/cli (error reporting) downloads a binary from Sentry's servers yes, if you upload source maps from this machine
protobufjs prints a warning if the version is wrong no
@firebase/util reads Firebase configuration for web apps from an environment variable not in a mobile app

Our web tool for 3D mockups has a similar ratio: the frontend has 613 packages, 5 of them with a script, and the backend 786 and 9. You can make the list yourself: go through node_modules and print the packages whose package.json has preinstall, install or postinstall in its scripts.

Step 3: Turn off install scripts by default

Since npm 12 (released July 8, 2026), dependency install scripts are off by default. According to InfoQ, you approve the list of allowed packages with npm approve-scripts and it is saved in package.json, so it applies to the whole team. npm 12 also no longer installs dependencies from git repositories or URL tarballs by default.

Steps for the switch:

1. update npm to version 12 on all machines and in CI
2. run an install and review the list of skipped scripts
3. approve only packages that really need their script (in our case @sentry/cli)
4. commit the allowlist together with package.json
5. decide again for every new package with a script

If you stay on an older npm, set ignore-scripts=true in .npmrc and run the scripts of the packages you need by hand. Watch out when you later move to npm 12: according to InfoQ, ignore-scripts takes precedence and the allowlist then silently does nothing. The pnpm, Yarn and Bun package managers have had similar settings for some time.

What this check doesn't cover

  • A local copy only sees what you have fetched. Pull requests and branches that the attacker created and deleted have to be checked directly on GitHub.
  • The attack started with stolen credentials, and nobody has published how the attacker got them yet. Two-factor authentication and short-lived tokens reduce the risk but don't remove it.
  • Disabled scripts don't protect against malicious code that only runs inside your app. That's what lockfiles, reviewing dependency changes and package scanning tools are for.

How the same app generates its puzzles is described in the guide on how to generate a word search. Need help with the security or build setup of a mobile app? Get in touch.

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